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The external cost of transport has been discussed in the European transport policy since the 
60s. However, it was not until the mid-90s that the European Commission decided on a 
pricing policy for the transport sector. This policy has stimulated a wide array of new 
research on the external cost of transport. A survey of some of the most recent studies in the 
area displays a clear picture; the latest studies are clearly focused on the marginal external 
cost and based on detailed bottom-up methods. The paper summarise the methods used to 
estimate some of the components of the marginal cost of transport - marginal infrastructure 
cost, congestion and scarcity cost, accident and environmental cost. The survey displays the 
huge variation in the estimates that follows from the use of more detailed databases. While 
this may be perceived as a problem for blunt pricing policies the paper suggests that it 
highlights the need for a more refined pricing policy in the transport sector. 
1. Introduction 
The principle of marginal cost based pricing has been discussed in the European transport 
policy since the 60s2. Already 1971 the Commission submitted a first proposal for a decision 
on a Common System of Charging for the Use of Infrastructure3. This proposal prescribed 
marginal social cost pricing and budgetary equilibrium and covered rail, road and inland 
waterways. The scope of the marginal social cost included the cost of use (i.e. maintenance), 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the second seminar of the IMPRINT-EUROPE Thematic 
Network: “Implementing Reform on Transport Pricing: Identifying Mode-Specific Issues”, Brussels, 14th/15th 
May 2002. 
2 See for example COM(64)389 and COM(68)567. 
3 COM(71)268 
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congestion and other external costs as noise, air pollution, and accidents4. However, no final 
decision was taken.  
Irrespectively of the policy failure at that time, economists continuously developed the ideas 
(e.g. Jansson (1984), Newbery (1989), Small (1989)). Nevertheless, it was not economists 
that pushed the principle back on the policy arena again. Environmental NGOs discovered, 
and finally accepted, the principle of pricing environmental damages in the early 90s. They 
forcefully, and successfully, lobbied for the principle (e.g. Kågesson (1993)). One of the 
appetizers for the environmental movement to embrace the marginal cost idea was that the 
principle called for higher prices for road transport, and a shift to environmental more 
friendly modes of transport. 
A number of reports where produced in the early 90s on the topic of external cost of transport 
(OECD(1994), UIC(1994)). The question was ‘hot’ and rediscovered and the theoretical 
background was not always clear. The result was often based on average cost estimates with a 
rough classification of internal and external cost. These studies often presented the result by 
mode, or rough sub categories of modes. The marginal cost principle was regarded as a 
weapon on the battlefield between modes of transport. At the end of this period the 
Commission presented a Green Paper ‘Towards Fair and Efficient Pricing in Transport’ 
(COM(95)691). While the main theme of the Green Paper was about marginal cost pricing it 
also played with budgetary equilibrium ideas.  
The latest policy development has stimulated a wide array of new research on the external 
cost of transport. This paper summarise the most recent developments in the measurement of 
marginal external cost5 and discusses the possible consequences for the transport policy this 
development may lead to.  
2. Recent progress in the measurement of external costs 
What do we know about marginal cost of transport? While the movement in the early 90s put 
the principle back on track, the recent development has put the issue on the ‘marginal cost’ 
track. More and more studies explicitly estimate the external marginal cost with a clear 
theoretical background. The paper focus on the short run marginal cost and only note that 
along the optimal expansion path the short run and long run marginal costs are the same. In 
the following, we divide the presentation into traditional subcategories, (2.1) infrastructure 
cost, (2.2) congestion and scarcity cost, (2.3) accident cost and (2.4) environmental cost.  
2.1 Infrastructure cost 
The short-run marginal infrastructure cost related to an additional vehicle on the road 
comprises three components; the increase in cost inflicted on other vehicles (road damage 
externality), the increased wear of the road leading to routine maintenance (marginal cost of 
road wear) and thirdly, the damage to the road leading to periodic maintenance in the future 
(marginal cost of road damage). In principle the same classification holds for other modes of 
transport. 
                                                 
4 Defined in COM(75)493 
5 Prepared for the second seminar of the IMPRINT-EUROPE Thematic Network: “Implementing Reform on 
Transport Pricing: Identifying Mode-Specific issues”, Brussels, 14th/15th May 2002. 
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Associated with the two last categories the question we want to have an answer on may be 
phrased: ‘what is the extra cost imposed on the road authority in region A if an additional 
truck with a gross laden weight of 40 tonne and 4 axles run 1400 km across the region’. If we 
know the answer, it would be appropriate to demand the truck operator to pay a price equal to 
the cost. Maintenance is produced in mainly two different forms, routine maintenance and 
periodic maintenance.  
Routine maintenance 
There is a rich body of literature in traditionally economics on production functions and on 
cost functions but literature on cost functions purely for the infrastructure use is rare. The 
reason has been a limited interest and need – for example for pricing purposes – to analyse 
infrastructure cost and cost causation relationships. However, the situation has changed. The 
vertical separation of the rail industry into a track authority and one or more operators has its 
implication for pricing policy and data availability; infrastructure use are charges 
independently and cost related to infrastructure is accounted for separately from train 
operation costs. The development of kilometre charging for heavy vehicles in Europe will 
further increase the demand on such studies. 
Johansson and Nilsson (2001) use this opportunity and collect information by some 250 track 
units, i.e. segments of rail tracks. For each track unit, information on (routine) maintenance 
expenditure, traffic volume, number of switches, quality of the track etc is collected for 
Swedish and Finnish railways. Not all expenditures are recorded by segment and a part of the 
costs are classified as common costs. Some of these costs are truly common, while others 
probably should have been allocated to the track unit with a better accounting system.  
The authors employ the Translog function of Berndt and Christensen (1972) and derive 
marginal cost estimates. The result suggests that the average costs for maintaining tracks in 
those two countries decrease with traffic load. This is analogous with the familiar u-shape of 
a production cost curve. As both the Finnish and the Swedish data indicate a decreasing cost 
activity the revenues will fall short of total cost. The rate of cost recovery is estimated to 17% 
in Finland and 12% in Sweden, in the latter case a larger part of the costs has been perceived 
as common costs, and therefore not allocated to track unit.  
 
Table 1. Marginal cost in €/100 gross ton km for Swedish and Finnish railroads 
Country Sweden Finland 
Year 1995 2000 1995 2000 
ALL tracks 0.012 0.013 0.016 0.024 
Main/electrified tracks 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.018 
Secondary/non-electrified tracks 0.097 0.099 0.026 0.040 
Based on Johansson and Nilsson (2001). Exchange rate: 9.40 €/SEK. 
 
Similar approaches have been tried in the road sector based on longitudinal observations 
(Link et.al. (2002), Li et.al. (2001) and Martin (1994)). Some of these studies also cover the 
periodic maintenance. However, the general lesson is that the data availability is much more 
problematic in the road sector. Maintenance expenditures are seldom recorded by road 
segment but more often by regions. This increases the necessary effort to construct a 
disaggregated database or increases the challenge for the econometric analysis to disentangle 
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the different elements that causes regional maintenance expenditures to vary. One outcome 
would be to synthesis the data as Ghaeli et.al. (2000) or, as proposed here, disentangle the 
estimates for routine maintenance and periodic maintenance. However, this separation 
demands that the correlation between routine and periodic maintenance expenditures are 
understood and taken into account. 
Periodic maintenance 
The approach taken above is suitable for routine maintenance cost. For periodic maintenance, 
extremely long time series are needed to be able to find the necessary pattern. Instead, an 
alternative shortcut, originally developed by Newbery (1988a, 1988b and 1989) for the road 
sector, can be employed. The upper layer of infrastructure, tracks or pavement, has to be 
renewed within certain intervals. The cost for all future maintenance cycles can be expressed 
as a present value, i.e. the future cost is discounted and summarised. Our initial question can 
be rephrased; will the entrance of the truck change the present value of the future periodic 
maintenance cost of the road authority? 
The key relationship to understand is how the traffic load will affect the pavement cycle. 
Under some general assumptions it can be proven (Lindberg (2002a)) that the marginal cost 
related to periodic maintenance for an average road is primarily a product of the average cost 
(AC) and an elasticity (ε), which expresses the changed lifetime of the pavement as the traffic 
load changes. The average cost is defined as the reinvestment cost (C) per passing vehicle (Q) 
over the pavements lifetime (T).  
AC -  MCAverage ε=  (1) 
where: 
 
T
Q
dQ
dT
=ε  Deterioration elasticity 
   AC
QT
C
=  Average cost 
Road engineers seldom have been interested in the marginal cost of transport, but they 
certainly have been interested in the lifetime of a pavement and what affects the lifetime. One 
important conclusion, highlighted by Turvey (2001), is that if the economist rephrases the 
question, much knowledge will be revealed from engineers. In a long term pavement 
performance project in Sweden lifetime functions have been estimated based on cracking 
(Wågberg 2001). Similar approaches have been taken in other countries and in European 
Union research (PARIS). If we assume a terminal value of a quality index, when we believe 
the road needs to be repaved, the change in time when this terminal value is reached due to 
changes in traffic load will decide the elasticity. The table below shows some of the result for 
Sweden. The elasticity increases (in absolute number) as the road strength weakens and as the 
total traffic load on the road increases6. Two observations can be made; the truck operator 
should pay a higher share of the average cost of pavement if he uses the low quality secondary 
                                                 
6 The assumption by Newbery(1989) implied that the elasticity was one, and consequently the marginal cost 
equals the average cost.  
 Gunnar Lindberg 391 
 
network than if he uses the high quality main network. Secondly, a charge equal to marginal 
cost will not recover the total cost of pavement. The approach taken can readily be applied on 
periodic maintenance of rail tracks although we have not found any such study. 
 
Table 2. Lifetime elasticity 
Strong road base    Weak road base Standard axles per day 
and direction 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 
200 - - - - - - -0,21 
300 - - - - -0,30 -0,40 -0,47 
400 - - -0,21 -0,37 -0,47 -0,55 -0,60 
500 - - -0,37 -0,49 -0,58 -0,64 -0,68 
600 - -0,30 -0,47 -0,58 -0,65 -0,70 -0,74 
700 -0,10 -0,40 -0,55 -0,64 -0,70 -0,74 -0,77 
800 -0,21 -0,47 -0,60 -0,68 -0,74 -0,77 -0,80 
900 -0,30 -0,53 -0,65 -0,72 -0,77 -0,80 -0,82 
- = not allowed combination , The road base strength is measured in surface curvature index (SCI). 
Source: Lindberg (2002a) 
 
The table above is based on standard axles. A measure of standard axles per vehicle has to be 
applied to derive a cost per vehicle. The common knowledge is to apply the so called forth 
power rule to estimate the cost for different vehicle categories with different axle loads. The 
rule emerges from the AASHO-Road-Test, which derived within an engineering experiment a 
relationship between road damage and axle weight. The fourth power rule indicates that 
doubling the axle weight increases road damages by a factor of 16 (=24). This rule is almost 
universally applied and it decided the structure of the European Union regulation on heavy 
goods vehicle taxation (COM(99)62)). However, basic new research on the applicability of 
the forth power rule is lacking. 
User cost 
Finally, a cost component that often is forgotten in estimates of the wear-and-tear is the 
increased vehicle cost and discomfort for subsequent road users as the road deteriorates. 
Consequently, we should add a third question; what is the present value of the changed road 
user cost to all subsequent road users as a result of the damage caused by the tuck? In 
principle this has been explored (Newbery 1988a, 1988b, 1989) and it has been shown that it 
is both a negative effect, the increased roughness, and a positive effect, the shorter lifetime 
give the users a new surface earlier. Under some circumstance these effects cancel out.  
An alternative approach, sometimes advocated, to estimate the marginal infrastructure related 
cost of road use is to apply already existing Pavement Management Systems (e.g. Gronau 
(1994)). Such systems cover all three cost components discussed above. However, these 
models are not developed for the purpose of estimating marginal effects. It is not certain that 
the functions have been properly specified to truly capture the marginal effect of increase 
number of vehicles, and only that effect. 
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2.2 Congestion and scarcity cost 
A Swedish research project on marginal cost of transport suggests that ‘we know what we 
need to know of the marginal cost of road congestion and slot allocation of rail tracks – it is 
now a question of implementation’7. Although this statement may be too strong, it 
encapsulates the main findings. Research on congestion pricing is not about the external 
marginal cost – the principle has been known for long (Walters 1961) – but to design policy 
packages and pricing schemes that can be successfully implemented. Nevertheless, this is the 
right place to examine some of the features of congestion and scarcity costs.  
Scarcity cost 
Let us assume that a train operator plans to run a new line. The marginal infrastructure cost 
was presented above and the additional question we need to ask is ‘what is the extra cost this 
train operator will impose on the rail authority and other operators due to scarce capacity?’ 
To be able to introduce the new line, the operator needs slots on the tracks he intends to pass. 
If slots are available, the operator should be allowed to run the line for free, given that he pays 
for the rail damage cost and other externalities. Presumably, not all tracks will be free at the 
time he wants to run the train. Someone has to allocate the slots between interested operators. 
A promising method is to auction the slots; the bidder that will pay the highest price will have 
the right to use the track. The bidder with the lowest willingness-to-pay has to leave the 
scene. The cost for the rail sector due to the entrances of the new operator is the value of the 
train that cannot run anymore, i.e. the willingness-to-pay of the train that left the track. The 
auctioning principle has been proven to work in rather complicated networks in field 
experiments (Nilsson 1999, 2002). The same principle can be introduced at airports or 
harbours.  
As the scarcity price increases on certain links of the rail network, the rail authority will have 
information on where to expand the capacity and, indeed, the authority may have revenues to 
finance such investments. It has of course to be ensured that the track authority does not use 
his market power to restrict the capacity in order to increase the revenues form scarcity 
pricing.  
Congestion cost 
For road transport the estimate of the scarcity, or congestion cost, is somewhat different. In 
this mode, it is not a question of a limited number of slots. It is a question of decreasing 
quality of service for other road users as the number of cars increases. For many years, studies 
have been carried out using volume delay functions that depicts the change in speed as the 
number of vehicles increases. The reduced speed for all users is valued and the average cost 
born by the road user is subtracted. The remaining cost is the external congestion cost that 
could be introduced in a road-pricing scheme.  
The main problem in estimating congestion cost is to anticipate the reaction of the users; 
while it is relatively simple to estimate the external congestion cost at the current traffic load 
the cost at the optimal traffic load, that will be the result of a road pricing scheme, is much 
more difficult to assess. The researcher has to have a good knowledge on the reactions of 
users. A speculative assumption is that we in the near future, when road pricing scheme has 
                                                 
7 Source: www.vti.se/tek 
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been introduced more widely (London, Stockholm), will find that the elasticity is 
underestimated because users find unexpected ways to adapt to the pricing scheme. 
The revenues from congestion pricing scheme will give information on where the transport 
system should be expanded; in the same way as the revenues from slot auctioning. However, 
it is no predetermined rule that the revenues from scarcity or congestion pricing should be 
invested in the same mode of transport. Clever use of the revenues is at the backbone of a 
successful implementation. 
2.3 Accident cost 
A part of the traffic accident problem can be explained by the fact that the user, in his 
decision, does not consider all costs related to an accident - a part of the accident cost is 
external to the user. Two important principles are included in this external marginal cost 
component; first, the term external suggest that we are only interested in the cost not already 
borne by the user and, secondly, the term marginal suggest that we examine the change in 
cost at the margin when the user takes a decision. We consider here the decision to make a 
trip; the external marginal accident cost is related to distance (kilometre). The question we try 
to answer could be; ‘what is the extra accident cost imposed on other road users and society 
at large if a HGV travels on the German autobahn from Travemünde to Frankfurt? 
The external accident cost has been discussed by Vickrey (1968), Newbery (1988c) and 
Jansson (1994). These studies focus on the external marginal cost related to cars as a 
homogenous unit. If heterogeneity is taken into account the external marginal accident cost 
will depend on four elements as discussed by Lindberg (2002b): the cost of an accident 
(a+b+c)8, the accident risk (r), the proportion of the cost already born by the examined user 
(θ) and the risk elasticity (E). The latter expresses the change in risk as the traffic volume 
changes. Each of these elements raises questions on their own when the marginal cost shall be 
estimated. 
( ) )1()1(M ErcbaErC ++++−= θ  (2) 
The most important element in the cost of an accident is the risk value, or value of statistical 
life. The issue of the valuation of accidents is complicated. However, nowadays the CVM 
method is an accepted method to find values on the so-called risk value, i.e. the users’ 
willingness-to-pay for a small risk reduction. This is often transferred to a value of statistical 
life but has nothing to do with a valuation of the life per se. While the use of this value today 
is in the mainstream, it should be noted that the method has some internal problems, which 
need to be solved in the future (see Beattie (1998) and Carthy (1999)).  
While accident statistics may be good in many cases, although underreporting has to be 
considered separately, the possibility of finding information on exposure (e.g. kilometre 
driven) is in general very poor. The problem of finding a measure of exposure also means that 
the possibility to estimate accident functions, and consequently to be able to say something 
about the relationship between accident risk and traffic volume (the elasticity), is limited. 
Nevertheless, research suggests that the risk is almost constant or even decreasing but that it 
varies with traffic flow (Vitaliano et.al (1991), Dickerson et.al. (2000)). Decreasing risk is 
                                                 
8 a = private accident cost to the users, b= risk value of relatives and friends, c = system external cost such a 
medical cost financed with general taxes. 
394 Recent progress in the measurement of external costs… 
 
compatible with an increasing number of accidents, but the number of accidents does not 
increase in proportion to the increased traffic volume.  
The possible reasons why the risk declines has its implications for pricing. One reason could 
be that reduced speed is the duality of the increased safety; the cost is then captured in the 
congestion cost. The other reason is that people protect themselves in ways that we do not 
observe. For example, unprotected road users may take other routes or choose the car instead 
of the bicycle as the traffic volume increases. The cost for this behaviour is a part of the 
marginal accident cost, but is not estimated. 
To find the marginal external accident cost it is necessary to make a distinction between cost 
internal to the examined user and costs that are external. The latter consists of (minor) cost 
born by the rest of society (some medical cost etc) and the dominant cost of imposing an 
accident risk on other users. It is often assumed that the user understands his own risk and 
consequently already bears the value related to his own risk of being a victim.  
The external accident cost of heavy goods vehicles is a focal point for many of the interesting 
problems on accident externalities. In the table below the internal and external average 
accident cost per kilometre and weight class are summarised form a recent study (Lindberg 
(2002b)). The latter includes the cost for the non-truck part in the accident as well as the 
system external medical cost etc. The average external cost per kilometre varies from 0.02 
€/vkm for the lightest class up to 0.099 €/vkm for the heaviest vehicles. An important 
observation is the falling part of internal cost as the weight increases. For the first weight 
class the proportion internal cost is 0.27 and for the heaviest the proportion is only 0.03. To 
neglect this split into internal and external will thus overestimate the external accident cost 
for lighter vehicles. 
The risk declines with increasing distance for a single weight class (elasticity -0.63 - -0.91), 
which means that the marginal cost is below the average cost. The external marginal accident 
cost varies from 0.006 €/vkm to 0.033 €/vkm with an average between 0.008 and 0.011 
€/vkm for trucks above 12 tonnes. The study focuses on driven distance by individual 
vehicles. This is different from the traffic volume on a single road. It can be expected that 
vehicles driven longer distances drive more on interurban roads, have a more experienced 
driver and may be better maintained. The analysis may therefore understate the risk resulting 
from an equi-proportionate increase in traffic on all roads. 
 
Table 3. External marginal accident cost, HGVs, Sweden 1999. 
Weight 
tonne 
Internal Cost 
(€/vkm) 
External Cost 
(€/vkm) 
Proportion 
internal (θ) 
External Marginal Cost 
(€/vkm) 
3.5 – 11.9 0.007 0.020 0.27 n.a 
12 – 14.9 0.005 0.032 0.13 n.a  
15 – 18.9 0.004 0.065 0.06 0.006 - 0.010 
19 – 22.9 0.003 0.031 0.08 0.007 – 0.009 
23 – 26.9 0.006 0.048 0.11 0.008 – 0.012 
27 – 30.9 0.003 0.050 0.06 0.015 – 0.017 
31 -  0.003 0.099 0.03 0.030 – 0.033 
Above 12t 0.004 0.047 0.08 0.008 – 0.011 
 
The recent developments solve the issue of multi-modal accidents. A long time question has 
been the allocation of cost in relation to road-rail collision accidents at level crossings. 
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Lindberg (2002b) estimates an external marginal accident cost by protection device for road-
rail level crossings. A highly differentiated pricing scheme would use this information and 
employ a specific cost for each track unit.  
 
Table 4. Marginal accident cost for trains at road-rail level crossings (€/train passage) 
Crossing type €/passing train 
ALL 0.032 
  Full barriers 0.036 
  Half barriers 0.087 
 All barriers 0.059 
 Open crossing w. light or St Andrew cross 0.102 
  Open crossing with light 0.097 
  Open crossing with St Andrew cross 0.184 
 No protection device 0.006 
Exchange rate 9.4 SEK/€ 
2.4 Environmental cost 
The development in estimate of environmental cost follows the mainstream in marginal cost 
estimates going from top-down to bottom-up. Friedrich and Bickel (2001) highlight that the 
top-down approach only can be used to address general issues like ‘is train transport in 
general and average more environmentally friendly than road transport’ (p1). The bottom-up 
approach can be used to develop detailed environmental regulations and pricing. The question 
asked is; ‘what is the environmental damage of a car with the EURO I technology driving in 
Brussels centre at lunchtime? If we know the answer, the cost can be included in road pricing 
schemes. 
 
Emissions 
▼ 
Transport and Chemical conversion 
▼ 
Concentration and Deposition 
▼ 
Response of Receptors 
▼ 
Physical Impact 
▼ 
Change in Utility 
▼ 
Welfare Losses 
▼ 
Costs 
Source: based on Friedrich and Bickel (2001) 
Figure 1. The impact pathway approach 
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The common bottom-up approach used in Europe is the impact pathway approach, which has 
been developed within a series of research projects financed by the European Commission 
(ExternE). The approach includes a sequence of events that links the emissions to the impact 
and subsequent valuation. 
The emissions are estimated for individual transport technologies, which are closely specified 
with respect to vehicle technology, location of the transport activity and type of fuel used. The 
model deals with the physical transport by wind of the emitted pollutants and chemical 
transformation. The output from this stage includes concentration and deposition of both the 
emitted components and secondary pollutants formed in the atmosphere. The next step 
includes the dose-response function, which transfers the dose, or exposure, to physical 
impacts and health impacts. The final step leads to the economic valuation.  
The method is applied to all modes of transport and for railways, also the upstream effects of 
the energy generation processes are calculated. The method has been tested in a number of 
European Union countries and could clearly be transferred between countries (Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, The Netherlands and United Kingdom).  
The huge amount of input functions certainly means that some of them are not well suited for 
a certain application. Continuously development of local knowledge is necessary. The dose-
response functions come in a variety of forms, they may be linear or non-linear and contain 
thresholds or not. The shape of the function has implications for the result; if the function is 
strongly non-linear or includes threshold values the marginal effect of a certain vehicle 
technology will not be the same as the average effect. Not all environmental effects have been 
quantified with dose-response functions. While global warming is included with an abatement 
cost value no such values are included for acidification or eutrophication. 
 
Table 5. Damage cost in €/100 vkm  
Country and town/area Petrol cars EURO II Diesel cars, EURO II 
Belgium, rural 0.22 0.45 
Belgium, Brussels 0.84 3.31 
Finland, Helsinki 0.31 1.00 
German, Stuttgart 0.44 1.33 
German, Güstrow-Neustrelitz 0.14 0.25 
Greece, Athens centre 1.53 6.52 
Greece, rural2 0.26 0.47 
Netherlands, Groningen 0.17 0.41 
Netherlands, Amsterdam 0.54 2.46 
United Kingdom, London 1.10 4.46 
United Kingdom, rural 0.14 0.29 
Source: Friedrich and Bickel (2001) p 209-210. 
3. Conclusions and implications for transport pricing reforms. 
The structure of the marginal infrastructure cost, both for rail and road, shows a similar 
pattern; higher costs on low standard networks and lower costs on high standard networks. In 
addition, the estimates are found on the decreasing part of a production cost curve implying 
that the marginal cost will fall short of the average cost. The study on rail track costs suggests 
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that similarities between countries are considerable but not complete. Few published studies 
are carried out on airfield wear-and-tear and we cannot judge on the magnitude and structure 
of this cost component. For inland waterways and maritime transport the infrastructure 
maintenance cost is small and is mainly a question at harbours. 
In principle, the results of congestion or scarcity cost have been around for a long time. 
Auctioning of slots for rail tracks, airfields or harbours will reveal the information on the 
scarcity cost. In the road sector, the applied principle has been around for even longer. The 
latest development is more about detailed transportation models that capture more of the 
adjustment process than any new methods. In the same way as for scarcity costs, the 
congestion cost gives information on necessary expansion of the transportation capacity. To 
ensure that congestion and scarcity pricing are increasing the welfare, the revenue has to be 
used in a clever way and it is no predetermined rule that says it should be introduced to 
expand the capacity of the same mode. 
The principle of external marginal accident cost is complicated and some issues still have to 
be resolved. However, many answers have been given in the most recent development but 
more studies on the risk function have to be carried out before the marginal cost can be 
differentiated by vehicle and by road type with certainty. We know that the potential victims 
may react to the increased risk with a costly risk avoiding behaviour. The cost of this risk 
avoiding behaviour should thus be added. Finally, we should not only concentrate on the 
external marginal cost when internalisation of accident costs is discussed. Internalisation can 
result in an optimal traffic volume under an in-optimal behaviour.  
A huge amount of European Union research effort has gone into the development of the 
impact pathway approach and the ExternE model. The result is a common methodology that 
has been applied in almost 10 different countries and for all modes of transport. The results 
are robust, although not free from uncertainty, and can be seen as the best estimate availably.  
The recent development in the measurement of the external cost of transport is focused 
around the move from top-down to bottom-up approaches. The use of more detailed 
databases with more sophisticated methods generates a more differentiated picture of the 
marginal cost of transport. First, new analysis suggests in many cases that the marginal cost is 
below the average cost - the familiar u-shaped cost curve is rediscovered. As many previous 
studies are based on average cost it is evident that the new studies will give a lower cost 
estimates. Secondly, past policies to curb transport cost have had an effect on the magnitude 
of the external cost. Modern engine technology emits only a fraction of emissions compared 
to older vehicles and vehicles tend to become safer and safer over time. Thirdly, it is evident 
that the cost varies largely between different subgroups of vehicles within the same mode.  
This development has implications for the pricing policy. The large variation in cost between 
subgroups within the same mode suggests that the transport policy should move from a macro 
perspective to a micro perspective. More emphasis should be given to intra-model efficiency 
than inter-model efficiency. Given the huge differences in marginal cost between, for 
example, different technologies of road vehicles, a pricing regime that encourages the use of 
better technology within a mode is more important than a shift between modes through a 
rough average cost pricing. If a modal shift will occur within such a differentiated pricing 
structure, it will be from the dirtiest technology of a mode to the cleanest technology of 
another mode. 
The other, more preliminary conclusion is that the marginal cost is highest on the low 
standard network. The implication for European road taxation legislation is clear, the 
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paragraph that limit user charges to only motorways, and similar roads, is a barrier for 
implementation of marginal costs and will lead to higher overall transportation cost in 
Europe. 
As the marginal cost falls below the average cost in many cases, the question on cost recovery 
becomes important. First, it should be acknowledge that congestion and scarcity pricing will 
generate revenues. However, cost recovery will be difficult to achieve with only marginal cost 
pricing in many cases.  
Given the successful result on the research on environmental cost, which was regarded as the 
most uncertain area for a couple of years ago, the use of proper theory and modern methods 
will hopefully lead to a convergence also of the more difficult marginal cost categories in the 
near future.  
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